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This article explains how clearing and settlement systems support a sound financial
system. In particular, the article analyzes the role of CCPs (central counterparties)
in managing risk in the securities and derivatives markets and some of the relevant
public policy issues.
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Clearing and settlement
usually begin with capturing
trade data and ensuring that
the specific terms of buyers’
and sellers’ trade records
match correctly.
Because of its role in fostering a sound
financial system, the Federal Reserve
Bank of Chicago has a keen interest in
clearing and settlement systems for se-
curities and derivatives1 products and,
in particular, the risk management, bank-
ing, and payment systems that support
such settlements. The Seventh Federal
Reserve District is home to five major
exchanges and three central counter-
parties (CCPs) that support much of the
activity on those exchanges, routinely
processing well over a billion dollars
in settlements daily.2 These CCPs have
substantial and, in some cases, complex
clearing linkages to other domestic and
international CCPs. CCPs also concen-
trate risk.
As these markets have grown significant-
ly, their potential impact on the nation’s
financial system has similarly increased.
This Chicago Fed Letter explores how the
operations of the CCPs’ margining and
settlement systems affect other CCPs,
payment systems, settlement banks, and
the financial system in general. We touch
upon some of the public policy impli-
cations and provide an introduction to
the arcane world of clearing and settle-
ment in general, and derivatives clear-
ing and settlement in particular.
How clearing and settlement work
Clearing and settlement usually begin
with capturing trade data and ensuring
that (if not performed already by an
organized market) the specific terms of
buyers’ and sellers’ trade records match
correctly (as a mirror image of the
other). Although this sounds simple
enough, some of the most complex clear-
ing processes involve the matching of
trades. Some clearing organizations re-
ceive perfectly matched (paired) trade
information from the exchange(s) that
they support. In general, the “trade
match” function is the gateway to a CCP’s
clearing system; hence it is often referred
to as a clearing system’s “front end.”
In most countries, clearing of securities
and derivatives products involves nova-
tion:3 the substitution4 of the CCP for
the original counterparties with respect
to future performance of all remaining
obligations (mostly but not exclusively
financial). In order to support its guar-
antee of performance, a CCP employs
a prudential risk management system
that includes the financial resources to
support its trade guarantee.5 While
clearing arrangements provide many
public and private benefits, there are
potential public policy implications as-
sociated with the concentration of con-
siderable risk within CCPs. Hence, the
President’s Working Group on Financial
Markets determined that CCPs “should
be subject to regulatory oversight in
order to help ensure that proper risk
management procedures are established
and implemented and that the clear-
ing system is properly structured.”6
Securities
The clearing and settlement of securities
can be highly automated if the securi-
ties are accounted for electronically and
if there are few securities depositoriesthat account for the ownership of such
“book-entry” securities. There are sig-
nificant network externalities associat-
ed with clearing: It is efficient for market
participants to clear and hold their se-
curities where other market participants
clear and hold their securities.
International guidelines prescribe that
the transfer of the ownership of a secu-
rity is conditional on the simultaneous
transfer of sufficient funds to pay for the
security in full (the concept of Delivery
versus Payment or DVP). Once title to
the security has been changed, the clear-
ing and settlement process ends and
the custody process begins.
Different security types have developed
different settlement conventions. Most
transactions involving bank certificates
of deposit and commercial paper settle
“for cash,” i.e., on the same business day.
Most U.S. Treasury securities settle “for
regular,” i.e., the next business day. Most
foreign exchange transactions settle “for
spot” or two business days after the trade
date (T+2). Most U.S. equity and munic-
ipal bond trades settle on a T+3 basis or
three business days after the trade is
executed.
Risk of settlement default can arise from
two sources. The seller either does not
have or does not properly deliver the
securities on the settlement date, a “short
fail.” Alternately, the buyer does not
have sufficient funds, a “long fail.” Se-
curities clearing organizations typically
(varies by country) have automated
procedures and financial resources at
hand to temporarily mitigate both long
and short fails. They also typically have
some risk management policies in place
to cover the temporal risk between
trade match and settlement.
In an effort to minimize the sheer num-
ber of transactions that must be settled,
many securities clearing and settle-
ment systems provide for the multilat-
eral netting of settlement obligations.
As settlement is often made by trade in-
termediaries that may have many pur-
chases and sales of the same security,
their net delivery obligation is the net
difference of purchases and sales, by
security/issue. All particulars regard-
ing such settlement obligations should
not be in dispute by the close of busi-
ness the day after the trade date. The
funds side of settlement is netted down
to a single payment either made to or
received from the CCP.
Securities clearing systems in mature
markets often reflect a hybrid of pub-
lic sector and private sector systems. In
the U.S., the Federal Reserve’s “book-
entry” system settles each U.S. Treasury
or agency securities transaction indi-
vidually, delivering the security to the
account of the receiving bank and charg-
ing the reserve balance of that bank at
veritably the same instant: a real-time,
gross settlement (RTGS) system. There
are several private sector enterprises that
clear government securities by netting
all possible transactions and then pro-
cessing the remaining transactions across
their own books, the “on us” transactions.
Such settlement services are subject to
supervisory oversight and minimum
standards. On these systems, only the
imbalance between purchases and sales
that can not be internalized is sent to
the Federal Reserve’s book-entry system
to settle. In some countries, the settle-
ment of sovereign debt securities occurs
entirely in the private sector.
Derivatives
The clearing and settlement of deriva-
tives transactions are very different
from those for securities. Rather than
clearing and settling in a few days (the
period during which a securities settle-
ment default might occur), derivatives
contracts often remain outstanding for
several months or years. Unlike securi-
ties where the security itself is delivered
and promptly paid for in full, derivatives
contracts represent the obligation (or
the option) to buy or sell a financial in-
strument at a future date, with buyer and
seller assuming (and presenting) signif-
icant financial risk to the CCP in the in-
terim. Whereas the CCP’s guarantee lasts
only a few days for securities, the CCP
revalues exchange-traded derivatives con-
tracts daily and requires market partici-
pants to continue to settle with the CCP
every day until the derivatives contracts
are liquidated, exercised, or mature.
While derivatives clearing systems have
the same familiar trade match “front
end” and banking and settlement “back
end” that securities clearing systems
have, derivatives clearing systems have
far more complex risk management,
margining, and collateral management
systems. Significant human and IT re-
sources are devoted to managing the
interim risk that a market participant
might fail to adequately maintain its
long or short position from the time a
trade is matched to the time that it is
either liquidated or matures.
Similar to securities clearing systems,
derivatives clearing organizations no-
vate trades, substituting the CCP as the
counterparty acting as seller to buyer
and buyer to seller, creating two new
contracts.7 Novation also allows the liq-
uidation of derivatives contracts prior
to maturity, a concept very different
from that of clearing securities trans-
actions. In all clearing systems, the
number of buyers (the number of con-
tracts representing contracts to pur-
chase the underlying instrument or
index) must always equal the number
of sellers. Novation allows market par-
ticipants to enter and leave the market-
place while keeping the number of
buyers (longs) and sellers (shorts)
equal at any point in time.
Besides providing risk management,
margining, and collateral management
practices to organized derivatives mar-
kets, the CCPs’ intermediation provides
other, more subtle benefits. For exam-
ple, the substitution of the CCP as the
central guarantor of performance al-
lows trading on organized securities and
derivatives markets to occur anonymous-
ly. Not all organized markets provide
anonymity.8 Although little empirical
research has been done in this area, it
is generally believed that market par-
ticipants utilize organized markets to a
greater extent when they can move in
and out of those markets with complete
anonymity. If one benefit of anonymi-
ty is increased market liquidity, this in
turn leads to more efficient price dis-
covery and trade execution.
To guarantee performance among clear-
ing participants, derivatives CCPs col-
lateralize market risk and revalue all
open positions daily. Derivatives con-
tracts typically involve the right to buy
or sell a standardized financial instru-
ment (e.g., 100 shares of General Elec-
tric). These contracts change in value
as they continue to be traded on the
relevant organized market. Either the
organized market or the CCP deter-
mines a daily settlement price for all
derivatives contracts. The CCP calcu-
lates the change in value from the most
recent settlement price to determine
the incremental gain or loss by contract.
Market participants with unrealized
incremental losses must pay such losses
in same-day funds (for futures) or postMichael H. Moskow, President; Charles L. Evans,
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additional performance collateral (for
options) with the CCP, which remits
the funds (or a margin credit) to mar-
ket participants with unrealized profits
on their contracts. These periodic pay-
ments, often called settlement variation
or variation margin balance to the penny
and prevent unrealized losses from accu-
mulating within the clearing system.9
To protect itself from a potential finan-
cial loss as the result of liquidating the
positions of a defaulting clearing partici-
pant,10 the CCP also requires all clearing
participants to deposit performance
collateral. The process of revaluing all
derivatives contracts to market prices
(marking-to-market), collecting incre-
mental unrealized losses, and passing
the value of the incremental unrealized
profits to firms with a credit balance
with the CCP, replenishes the value of
the performance collateral that the
CCP holds for all positions. Thus, in
most cases, CCPs set their performance
collateral requirements at levels that




On most organized markets, trade in-
termediaries stand between their clients
and the CCP.12 CCPs determine the
daily mark-to-market settlement amount
based on all of the clients’ positions of
a trade intermediary taken as one ac-
count, or origin. Virtually no data are
available concerning the frequency of
client defaults to trade intermediaries
because they are usually private events.
Not unlike the clearing organization
at the center of the settlement process,
trade intermediaries must absorb any un-
collateralized liquidation loss associat-
ed with the liquidation of a defaulting
client’s positions. This provides an incen-
tive for trade intermediaries to select
their clients carefully and to promptly
collect performance collateral and
settlement.
Settlement banks provide customized
commercial banking services to both
clearing organizations and the trade in-
termediaries that are also clearing par-
ticipants. CCPs notify both clearing
participants and their settlement banks
of their settlement obligations. Because
clearing participants are required to
grant CCPs debit authority over their set-
tlement accounts, settlement banks in-
dicate to the CCPs whether all demands
for payment will he honored or not.
A clearing member’s failure to “make
settlement” is tantamount to defaulting
to a CCP.
Besides providing credit intermediation
between CCPs and their clearing partic-
ipants, settlement banks may also pro-
vide critical commercial payment services,
enabling literally thousands of institu-
tional clients to settle their individual
obligations with their trade intermedi-
ary clearing participants. Derivatives
exchanges have rules requiring trade
intermediaries to collect performance
collateral and settlement variation
promptly from their clients. Clearing
participants settle with the CCP on be-
half of all of their clients in aggregate
and, in turn, need to promptly settle
with their own clients, typically via in-
terbank transfers.
Once trade intermediaries have settled
up with CCPs and with their own clients,
the market risk of one business day has
been essentially eliminated. Every time
that market risk has been flushed from
the larger settlement system, the value
of the performance collateral of clients
held by the trade intermediaries and
the performance collateral of clearing
participants held by the CCP is effective-
ly replenished for another business day.
This process is often highly automated.
Other public policy issues
Because of the critical role that central
banks play in fostering financial stabili-
ty in their economies, central banks have
a keen interest in current developments
that might upset or otherwise interfere
with the orderly settlement of financial
transactions. Some of the public policy
issues currently being debated include
issues relating to CCPs and clearing and
settlement best practices. For example,
one issue is the potential abuse of pseu-
do-monopoly powers by CCPs. Clear-
stream, the second largest international
securities clearing organization, based
in Europe, was sanctioned in June 2004
for refusing to provide cross-border se-
curities clearing and settlement services
and for applying discriminatory prices.13
Where there is a one-to-one relation-
ship between exchanges and clearing
organizations, holders of open positions
have no choice but to return to the mar-
ket where the initial position was opened
to liquidate it through its clearing or-
ganization. Where a clearing organiza-
tion clears economically equivalent
products for multiple exchanges, the
exchanges are forced to compete at
the product level rather than at the
exchange level. Both models appear
to perform equally well in providing
economies of scale and network exter-
nalities. Abuse of monopoly powers, in
general, artificially raises costs and de-
creases efficiency.
Derivatives cross-margining arrange-
ments require intricate cooperation
between CCPs. This may be difficult to
achieve if CCPs resist providing their
services to all qualified enterprises that
request them. The Commodity Futures
Modernization Act requires the Com-
modity Futures Trading Commission,
which regulates derivatives exchanges
and trade intermediaries in the U.S.14 to
“…facilitate the linking or coordination
of derivatives clearing organizations…,”
where the public good is served by do-
ing so.15
Another one of the issues that arises is
that the continued consolidation among
CCPs concentrates the aggregate risk
among fewer and fewer CCPs. This
consolidation among CCPs could raise
complex moral hazard issues if some
CCPs begin to be perceived by some
as “too big to fail.” Continued consoli-
dation of CCPs eventually gives rise to
the public policy conundrum, “How
many CCPs are too many; how few are
too few?” To date, little research has
focused on this important issue.To understand how clearing and settle-
ment systems operate, specifically how
the CCPs support today’s modern securi-
ties and derivatives markets, we need
1 Derivatives are a class of financial instru-
ments or contracts that derive their value
from some underlying stock, bond, com-
modity, index or other asset. Futures, swaps,
some forwards, options and warrants, and
certain mortgage-backed securities are
common derivative forms. Derivatives may
be exchange traded or privately negotiated.
2 The best known exchanges are Archipel-
ago (ArcaEx), the Board of Trade of the
City of Chicago, the Chicago Board Options
Exchange, the Chicago Mercantile Ex-
change, and the Chicago Stock Exchange.
The Chicago Climate Exchange, Eurex
US, the Merchants Exchange, NQLX,
OneChicago, and a number of nascent
organized markets and lesser-known ex-
changes are also located in the Chicago
area. The CCPs are the Clearing House
Division of the Chicago Mercantile  Ex-
change, The Options Clearing Corpora-
tion, and The Clearing Corporation.
3 A process through which the original ob-
ligation between a buyer and seller is dis-
charged, and is replaced by the substitu-
tion of the CCP as seller to buyer and buy-
er to seller, creating two new contracts.
4 In the United Kingdom and some other
British Law countries, novation is replaced
with the legal concept of open offer. Under
an open offer regime, the CCP is not au-
tomatically substituted as the counterparty.
If proper settlement of the trade is called
into question, either of the original coun-
terparties can then demand that the CCP
be substituted to complete the settlement
of the transaction.
5 Readers should not assume that CCPs’
guarantees are without limit. While still
being prudential, many CCPs’ guaran-
tees are finite.
6 President’s Working Group on Financial
Markets, Over-the-Counter Derivatives Markets
and the Commodity Exchange Act, November,
1999, p.14.
7 Committee on Payment and Settlement
Systems and Technical Committee of the
International Organization of Securities
Commissions, Recommendations for
Central Counterparties, November 2004,
Basel, Switzerland.
8 For example, the InterContinental Ex-
change (ICE) provides that the buyer
and seller may or may not opt for clearing
services. If either or both do not opt for
clearing and if there is sufficient unused
counterparty exposure available under
both counterparty limits to execute the
trade, the identities of buyer and seller
are revealed, and the bilateral exposures
are adjusted accordingly.
9 Settlement variation is often referred to
as variation margin, particularly in Europe.
However, Rule Books usually refer to the
pass-through of accumulated unrealized
profits as settlement variation.
10The CCP has to absorb a default liquida-
tion loss if the prices at which the CCP
liquidates the defaulting clearing partici-
pants’ positions are less favorable than
the settlement prices that were used for
the last settlement cycle (which the de-
faulting clearing participant satisfied). All
clearing participants were made whole by
the CCP using these prior valuations.
11Several CCPs set their requirements at
levels that would cover more than one day’s
market move for products where it is rea-
sonable to believe that positions would
take more than one day to liquidate.
12In a few countries, e.g., Spain, positions
are kept at the market participant level.
13The European Commission’s investigation
revealed that Clearstream had refused to
supply Euroclear Bank (its largest competi-
tor) with clearing and settlement services,
effectively preventing Euroclear from pro-
viding clearing services for German securi-
ties to its clients, and from competing with
Clearstream in that market.
14The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading
Commission is also responsible for allow-
ing foreign exchanges to provide their
products to market participants in the U.S.
157 U.S.C. §7a-1(f)(1).
to consider the intricate inter-relation-
ships that exist between CCPs and
payment systems, exchanges, trade
intermediaries, settlement banks,
depositories, market participants, and
other CCPs. One should not take this
financial “plumbing” for granted just
because it is often out of view.